Αποφθέγματα του δημιουργού και θεμελιωτή της Βέρμαχτ.

Για την κατάπνιξη της εξέγερσης του Ρουρ (1923):
"the German army took its stand in defence of peace and order against any Bolshevik and Spartacist attempt to seize power in Germany and thus strike a fatal blow at our people"

Για τους πολιτικούς της Βαϊμάρης:
"It is preferable to have a strong socialist at the top rather than these attention seeking counts and democrats who have become soft, and who hide their cold fear under a cloak of diplomacy"

Για το στρατό και τα κόμματα:
"Only through the fact that the Prussian army is removed by the constitution from the party struggle and the influence of ambitious party leaders has it become what it is: the secure defence of peace at home and abroad."

Για τους Εβραίους:
" the Jewish talent is purely critical, hence negative and can never help in the construction of a state. This is no good"

Για την εξωτερική πολιτική της Γερμανίας, τον Κεμάλ κλπ:
"Germany must pursue a policy of action. Every State must do that. The moment it stops pursuing a forward policy it ceases to be a State. An active policy must have a goal and a driving force. For carrying it out it is essential to assess one's own strength correctly and at the same time understand the methods and aims of the other powers.

The man who bases his political ideas on the weakness of his own country, who sees only dangers, or whose only desire is to remain stationary, is not pursuing a policy at all, and should be kept far away from the scene of activity.

The years 1814/15 saw France in complete military and political collapse, yet no one at the Congress of Vienna followed a more active policy than Talleyrand — to France's advantage. Has the world ever seen a greater catastrophe than that suffered by Russia in the last war? Yet with what vigor the Soviet Government recovered, both at home and abroad! Did not the Sick Man of Europe seem to be dead once more and for all, and buried by the Treaty of Sèvres? Yet today, after the victory over Greece, he stands up to England with confidence. He followed an active Turkish policy.

Have not Germany's first stirrings in active politics, the Treaty of Rapallo, clearly brought her at last nearer to being more respected?"

Για τo μέλλον της Γερμανίας:
"We must become powerful, and as soon as we have power, we will naturally take back everything we have lost"

Aπαντώντας στον παγγερμανιστή Χάινριχ Κλας, όταν αυτός του ζήτησε να συμμετάσχει μαζί με το στρατό σε δεξιό πραξικόπημα απέναντι στη Βαϊμάρη:
"a violation of the Constitution, an act of sedition. I tell you I will fight to the last shot against those of the left, the role of the Reichswehr is to maintain the unity of the Reich, and those who compromise this are its enemies, from whichever side they come."
(εδώ στην αρχή λέει ότι θα πολεμήσει "αυτούς της αριστεράς", στη συνέχεια όμως λέει ότι είναι αντίθετος σε πραξικόπημα "από όπου κι αν προέρχεται". Θεωρία των άκρων version 0.0)

Για την τύχη των στρατιωτικών πραξικοπημάτων χωρίς τη λαϊκή υποστήριξη:
"it is most undesirable that the army be called in to maintain public order: that is beyond the scope of its function which is external, and for this it urgently needs the people’s trust and its prompt support, which it risks losing if it is employed as a police force. Βayonets may be able to conquer power for a moment but that without approval and consent from at least a large portion of the mass of the people, power cannot be maintained. Revolutions which are made by the army alone usually destroy the foundations of the army. They do not last long; the confidence of the people has always been a sounder basis for state leadership than guns or bayonets."
(από το "Zukunft des Deutsche Reiches" (1930)

Υπερασπιζόμενος τη γενοκτονία των Αρμενίων:
"It is an impossible state of affairs to be allied with the Turks and to stand up for the Armenians. In my view any consideration, Christian, sentimental, and political should be eclipsed by a hard, but clear necessity for war"
(σου λέει, φίλοι μας είναι οι Τούρκοι, μην κλαίτε πολύ εσείς οι πασιφιστές που σκοτώνουν τους Αρμένηδες, στον πόλεμο υπάρχει ρεαλισμός)

O στρατηγός δείχνει την αγάπη του για τους Πολωνούς:
"Poland’s existence is intolerable and incompatible with the essential conditions of Germany’s life. Poland must go and will go — as a result of her own internal weaknesses and of action by Russia — with our aid. For Russia, Poland is even less tolerable than it is for us; Russia will never put up with Poland's existence. With Poland, one of the strongest pillars of the Versailles System will fall. To attain this goal must be one of the firmest aiming points of German politics, because it is attainable. Attainable only by means of, or with the help of, Russia. [...] The restoration of the border between Germany and Russia is the precondition for regaining strength of both sides. Germany and Russia within the borders of 1914 should be the basis for an agreement between us [...]."
Τι γλυκούλης!

Για τον πόλεμο:
"War is a bankruptcy of policy."

Για τον Χίτλερ:
"We were one in our aim; only our paths were different."

Για το σύνταγμα και τη σοσιαλδημοκρατία:
"The Weimar Constitution is for me not a noli me tangere; I did not participate in its creation, and it is in its basic principles contrary to my political thinking...I believed that a change of the constitution was approaching, and that I could help towards this by methods which were not unnecessarily to lead through civil war. So far as concerns my attitude towards the international Social Democracy, I have to confess that at the outset I believed in the possibility to winning over part of it to national co-operation; but I have revised this opinion long ago, a long time before our conversation, in so far as the Social Democratic Party is concerned, nto the German working class as such...I see clearly that a collaboration with the Social Democratic Party is impossible because it repudiates the idea of military preparedness...I do not consider a Stresemann cabinet viable, not even after its transformation. This lack of confidence I have expressed to the chancellor himself as well as to the president, and I have told them that in the long run I could not guarantee the attitude of the Reichswehr to a government in which it had no confidence...A Stresemann government cannot last without the support of the Reichswehr and of the forces standing behind it."
(από γράμμα στον φον Καρ)

Για τις γερμανοσοβιετικές σχέσεις (1920):
"You know that my wishes go in the direction of a conciliation with Russia which opens up further possibilities and prepares them. Only we must not try to make Russia too strong"

Πάλι για τις γερμανοσοβιετικές σχέσεις:
"As I consider a future political and economic agreement with Great Russia to be the immutable aim of our foreign policy, we must attempt at least not to make an enemy of Russia...I refuse to support Poland, even if that means that Poland will be eaten up. On the contrary, I reckon with this, and if at the moment we cannot help Russia to regain her old Imperial frontiers, we should at least not hinder her from doing so...The same applies to Lithuania and Latvia"

Πάλι για τις γερμανοσοβιετικές σχέσεις:
"Only in firm co-operation with a Great Russia will Germany have the chance of regaining her position as a world power...Britain and France fear the combination of the two land powers and try to prevent it with all their means—hence we have to seek it with all our strength...Whether we like or dislike the new Russia and her internal structure is quite immaterial. Our policy would have had to be the same towards a Tsarist Russia or towards a state under Kolchak or Denikin. Now we have to come to terms with Soviet Russia—we have no alternative...In Poland France seeks to gain the eastern field of attack against Germany and, together with Britain, has driven the stake which we cannot endure into our flesh, quite close to the heart of our existent a a state. Now France trembles for her Poland which a strengthened Russia threatens with destruction, and now Germany is to save her mortal enemy! Her mortal enemy, for we have none worse at this moment. Neva can Prussia-Germany concede that Bromberg, Graudenz, Thorn, (Marienburg), Posen should remain in Polish hands, and now there appears on the horizon, like a divine miracle, help for us in our deep distress. At this moment nobody should ask Germany to lift as much as a finger when disaster engulf Poland."