Author Topic: Τα λέγανε οι γεροντάδες και ο Λιακόπουλος!  (Read 354 times)

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Τσάμπα χαίρεστε σοσιαλιστές. Η οικονομία σας είναι για τα σκουπίδια, δεν μπορείτε να τα βάλετε με τους καπιταλιστές, ούτε καν μια επέμβαση στη Μέση Ανατολή δεν μπορείτε να κάνετε, σαν κι αυτές που κάνουν οι ημι-καπιταλιστές αμερικανοί εδώ και δεκαετίες.

While Russia’s air campaign in Syria has been accompanied by a tsunami of PR and propaganda that is unprecedented for its Ministry of Defense, a fair amount of caution is advised in assessing the overall effectiveness of the Russian air strikes. In the first six days of the operation (between September 30 and October 5), the Latakia-based group comprising 30 strike aircraft (12 Su-24Ms, 12 Su-25s, and six Su-34s) of Russia’s Airspace Forces (ASF) flew approximately 120 attack missions hitting 51 targets.

For comparison’s sake, between June 14, 2014 and September 29, 2015, as part of the Inherent Resolve operation against IS within Iraq and Syria, the US and allies flew 56,819 sorties (admittedly, that number includes support flights) and delivered 7,162 air strikes (of which 2,579 in Syria). It would be mistaken to suggest that they had any radical impact on the IS forces’ activities, let alone achieved the Caliphate’s destruction. Notably, the Western coalition has almost exclusively relied on precision air munitions (whereas the Russian group also makes heavy use of old-fashioned gravity bombs); it possesses much more efficient reconnaissance, target selection, and targeting facilities (suffice it to mention the extensive use of relevant under-wing pods, which the Russian ASF has exactly zero of); and generally has much vaster and virtually non-stop 25-year experience of deployment and combat operations in the region, complete with well-oiled mechanisms for interaction and air force combat operations.

Therefore, the Russian air strikes have had (and likely will have) a limited and, probably, largely moral significance in terms of impact on ISIS forces proper. At the same time, Russian ASF actions could have much more substantial sub-strategic impact on the situation at the frontline of the SAA’s fight against other rebel groups, whether “moderates” supported by the West or radical Islamists, such as Al-Nusra.

The Russian intervention in Syria occurred at a time when the situation of Assad’s forces somewhat stabilized. Notably, the Russians refrained from intervening in July and early August 2015, when the SAA suffered substantial blows at the hands of its opponents (first and foremost, radical Islamists). By September, Assad had managed to restore the frontline’s integrity, while the Islamist assault had lost its steam. This once again demonstrates that, in making its decision to intervene in Syria, Moscow gave more consideration to external factors (such as the threat of Western intervention) than to internal Syrian aspects.

sauce: ρωσικό think tank
« Last Edit: November 25, 2015, 09:30:46 pm by Pinochet88 »